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A CRIMINAL PROSECUTION IN THE PHILIPPINES.
A contribution has been received from the Philippine Islands
describing a trial that recently took place. It is worthy
of attention, as it indicates some of the peculiar conditions and
difficulties which our government has had to meet. These problems
are further illustrated in Mr. Wilfley's article in the present number
on "Trial by Jury and 'Double Jeopardy' in the Philippines." The
same author hag also shown how well many of these problems have
been solved in the North American Review for May.* In view of
the present interest in the topic, we regret that a lack of space
prevents the publication in its entirety of the account of a trial
that "graphically unfolds the lights and shadows of Filipino life
and character." The following, however, is an abridgement describ-
ing the offense and the prisoner,-and that criminal law to be applied
-so complicated in its provisions that one is at a loss to tell who
receives the punishment after all, the lawyers and the court, or the
accused.
The specific charge against the defendants is that on a certain
night they entered and robbed a store belonging to a Spanish
mestizo, the owner residing in .the building. The robbers bound
*"The New Philippine Judiciary," North American Review, Vol. I78: No.
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the arms of the proprietor, whom they found within the store-room,
and ransacked the building, taking away certain property consisting
of cloth and palay. After remaining in the store perhaps half an
hour, the idea of the duration of time being exceedingly vague in
the ordinary native mind, and evidence as to time being corre-
spondingly uncertain and unsatisfactory, most of the gang left the
building and proceeded to the beach. There they had left the boat
in which they came to the little pueblo where the crime was com-
mitted. Upon their arrival at the sea side the arms of the prisoner
were unbound, but he was forced to enter the boat by the two mem-
bers of the band to whose special custody he was committed, and
with prisoner and plunder the boot was rowed out to sea.
There were eight men in the boat, all of whom were armed,
beside the captive, who was unarmed and defenceless, which con-
dition is taken into consideration as an especially aggravating circum-
stance by the Spanish criminal code. After rowing some distance
from the shore the malafactors in charge of the prisoner turned
upon him and killed him with a blow in the neck from a bolo and
a thrust from a spear, a weight was tied to the body, which was
cast into the sea, and from henceforth Rafeal Butron was never
seen of men. The robbery, following the assault on the house,
occurred about seven o'clock, the murder followed probably fully
an hour later, which transactions, as provided by the Spanish
criminal law, transpired at night time, and by the same law noc-
turnity is to be considered by the trial judge as an aggravating
circumstance in meting out the fitting penalty to the offense proven.
The defendants were originally twelve in number, three have
died in prison, and one turned state's evidence. Beside the accused
before the court, three of the band, and those among the most
culpable from the testimony of their fellows, have never been ar-
rested; probably they are roaming among the mountains of the
interior or have escaped to another island.
Vicente, the tagallo, is apparently the chief actor of the band.
The other defendants seem to hold him in dread, and, I suspect,
withhold whatever they know of his participation in the outrage.
He is evidently superior to his fellows in intelligence and force of
character. He represents a type of his countrymen who are at the
present writing causing infinite trouble to the government and
people of the Archipelago. The instigator of crime and sedition
finds a wide field of operations in the Philippines. The prime
mover of most of the ladrone outrages is the man, or perhaps two
or three men, who concoct the enterprise and induce the barefooted
man to undertake its execution.
Another interesting character is the witness Pablo, one of the
accused testifying in his own defense, and who relates some things
that he saw and heard very damaging to defendants who are not
present and which do not inculpate himself. Pablo desires the
court to realize that he is deeply impressed with the realization that
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he is giving his testimony under oath. The poor fellow is shivering
with fear, probably of Vicente, who sits behind him, and he realizes
that every word he utters is heard by the grim tagallo and will be
remembered, perhaps to be revenged when the day of reckoning
comes. If left to himself, and the dread presence of Vicente were
withdrawn, Pablo would probably tell what part every one of the
gang took in the robbery and murder, excepting himself and two
members of his family who are among the accused. He tells the
facts as far as he dare under existing conditions. He tells who
killed the prisoner, how he was killed and what disposition was
made of the body. He tells of an unknown man who was walking
to and fro in front of the house of the murdered Spaniard, and,
as near as he dare, he says the man was Vicente, but in the presence
of Vicente dare not acknowledge his recognition of him. That the
accused shall be confronted with the witnesses against him is now
and has been since the American occupation a principle of the
criminal law of the Philippines. We would not venture to maintain
that the introduction of this primary rule of the criminal procedure
of the United States was an injudicious measure, but it cannot be
denied that in this section this rule of common right to the citizen
of the States affords a wide avenue of escape to innumerable crimi-
nals, permitting the instigator to go free and leaving the victims to
punishment.
In this country the circumstances attending the commission of
certain offenses are very different from those usually attendant
upon the same crime in the United States, as for instance, robbery
and homicide. Vicente, a prominent man in the community, has
a grievance against the Spaniard, Rafeal Butron. He wishes him
out of the way and decides upon his death. He directs his brother-
in-law, Alfonso, a chief actor in the tragedy, and one of the two
who had custody of the captive and dealt the death blow, to gather
a sufficient number of fellows of the baser sort and assault the
dwelling of Butron, take him prisoner and kill him. Alfonso
confers with Maximo and Roberto, who appear to have been kindred
spirits, ready and willing to undertake the commission. Alfonso
and his comrades serve the summons of their chief on Pablo, Rufio
and the other retainers, who willingly or unwillingly buckle on their
bolos, take their spears and set out on the expedition of robbery
and murder. All through the proceeding it appears between the
lines that though Alfonso, Maximo and Roberto are apparently
the chief actors, Vicente's hand is pulling the wires and that he is
the actual promoter of the crime.
Vicente does not go with the party to gather the recruits.
Vicente does not enter the house. Vicente does not accompany
the band with the prisoner to the seashore. Vicente is not present
at the deed of death. Vicente, however, is head and front of the
offending, the instigator by whose procurement the crime was com-
mitted.. When the ignorant dupes are called before the court to
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answer for the murder, Vicente confronts his puppets, who in his
presence are dumb as to giving utterance to testimony that might
anger their overlord and bring down upon them his future
vengeance.
This semi-savage blood compact entered into against the peace
of society, perhaps, more than any other instrumentality, has driven
poor and ignorant men into the ranks of the seditious and criminal.
The compact once written in blood, the terror is upon him, he dare
not withdraw if he would. The Katipunan holds its members with
a grip of steel. Its mysterious influence is felt all over the Philip-
pines. The vow once taken, a fear of impending doom holds the
votary to his unholy allegiance. He dare not divulge its secrets
or break away from the mystic brotherhood. The fear of its
vengeance seals his lips and drives him into danger and death at
the command of the leaders he has sworn to obey.
The Philippine Criminal Code carefully points out to the trial
judge what he shall consider an aggravating and what an extenuat-
ing circumstance. If a bully meet a frail consumptive on the street
and without provocation knock him down, the law obligingly
instructs the judge that the aggressor .took advantage of his superior
strength, and that in imposing the penalty he must give considera-
tion to this circumstance, and provides a scale of penalties to be
fitted to the peculiar conditions of the transaction. The judge is
presumed incapable of a fair consideration and comparison of all
the evidence in the case. To supply the deficiency in the judicial
intellect, a mechanical list of penalties are appended to the code,
constituting a sort of Chinese puzzle, from which the court and
attorneys figure out the fitting penalty at the close of the trial of
a criminal case.
This Spanish-American-Filipino code is a constant irritation
to the judge or practitioner from the United States. What any per-
son of sufficient intelligence to keep out of an. asylum for the feeble
minded would take into consideration as mitigating or aggravating
the offense, is minutely designated by the code. The trial judge is
unable to exercise a wise discretion, so essential to an impartial
and exact administration of justice according to the judicial mind
of the United States. Instead of being given latitude in the im-
position of penalties he is hampered by the innumerable restrictions
of this ridiculous code with its senseless minute classification.
Turning to the tabulated list, we find a statement of penalties un-
known to the American practitioner and which it is devoutly to be
hoped will speedily be swept from the statutes, and among them,
thirty-fourth on the list, presidio correctional in its minimum degree,
denoting imprisonment from 6 months and i day to 2 years and
4 months. The next penalty, thirty-fifth on the table is presidio
correccional in its medium degree, or imprisonment for 2 years,
4 months and i day to 4 years and 2 months. Then comes
presidio correccional in its minimum and medium denoting a term
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of from 6 months and I day to 4 years and 2 months; presidio
correccional in its medium and maximum, 2 years, 4 months and I
day to 6 years; presidio correccional in its maximum 4 years, 2
months and I day to 6 years. Then follows presidio correccional
in its minimum, medium and maximum, mixing in with presidio
mayor with its minimum, medium and maximum and arrest mayor,
cadena perpetua, cadena temporal, reclusion perpetua, reclusion
temporal, relegacion perpetua, relegacion temporal, perpetual and
temporal expulsion, confiniemento, banishment, public censure, cau-
tion, perpetual absolute disqualification, temporary absolute dis-
qualification, perpetual and temporary, special disqualification. After
the conclusion of the trial it is customary for the fiscal to ask the
imposition of a certain penalty, which the counsel for the accused
frequently opposes as too severe; then follows a prolonged search
through the labyrinth attached to the criminal code to determine
the penalty fitting the transgression, which ought to be decided by
the judge from a comparison and consideration of all the circum-
stances as shown by the evidence, and from a clearly defined scale
embracing a certain number of years as provided by the codes of
the several States of the Union. W. F. Norris.
Ramblon, P. I.
NEGRO PEONAGE AND THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT.
No little interest has been aroused by Judge Speer's recent
decision in the District Court at Savannah (United States v. Mc-
Clellan, 127 Fed. 971), maintaining the application of the Thir-
teenth Amendment to uphold the constitutionality of the statutes of
1867 against peonage, and their prohibition of recent attempts to
obtain forced labor from negroes to work out debts. This incipient
system of compulsory labor, with its partial return to ante bellum
conditions, would seem to have met with a large measure of appro-
bation among leaders in public affairs in the State. One of the
defendants was the sheriff of the county where the negro in question
was seized; members of Congress and other prominent men were
active in behalf of the defense; the opinion makes allusion to the
political aspect of the questions involved. For this reason the case
has an interest quite out of proportion to its legal importance, for it
is difficult to conceive that it could ever be successfully maintained
that involuntary servitude within the literal meaning of the Thir-
teenth Amendment was not charged by the indictment, on a demurrer
to which the case came before the court.
It is a more plausible proposition that the statute of 1867,
passed as it was to check the New Mexican system of peonage then
in operation, was not intended to have any such result as that
sought, but on this point, as on the other, the well-rounded arguments
of the court carry conviction. A rigid and impartial interpretation
of these provisions, which represent a large part of the tangible
results of our Civil war, will, it is to be hoped, check practises which,
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however much they may be approved by local opinion, are undoubt-
edly looked upon throughout the country as a whole as obnoxious to
the spirit of our institutions.
In this connection, it may not be out of place to note some of
the attempts which have been made to limit or extend the applica-
tion of this Thirteenth Amendment. It is hardly necessary to
-allude to the effort made in the Slaughter House Cases, i6 Wall. 36,
to include within "involuntary servitudes" monopolies created by
law in occupations which, in the absence of statute, would be lawful
for the public. In Tyler v. Heidorn, 46 Barb. 439, an interesting
'but futile attempt was made to apply the amendment to invalidate
an obligation to pay an annual rental in bushels of wheat in accord-
.ance with the covenant of the grantee of the land concerned. On
the ground that begetting a bastard child had been made a -mis-
demeanor it has been held not unconstitutional to compel the father
to work out fines under bastardy proceedings. Myers v. Stafford5,
114 N. C. 234. And a State constitutional provision substantially
similar to the Thirteenth Amendment has been held not to be
contravened by a statute providing that a Wilful failure by a laborer
without just cause to reasonably fulfill his contract should render
him liable to fine or imprisonment. State v. Williams, 32 S. C. 583.
Again, the employment at labor of a person committed to a city
prison, crediting him with one dollar a day on the judgment against
him is not repugnant to the Amendment. Topeka v. Boutwell, 53
Kan. 20. On the other hand, in Thompson v. Bunton, 117 Mo. 83,
a statute authorizing a vagrant, unconvicted of crime, to be hired
for six months to the highest bidder, was declared a contravention.
An exceptionally salutary application was.made when it was held
in Re Sah Quah, 31 Fed. 327, that the customs prevalent in Alaska
of slaveholding and enforced servitude among the native tribes
were not only contrary to the terms of the Amendment, but also
subject to its provisions.
As has been intimated, it is its connection with the race question
in the South which lends to the recent peonage case its chief im-
-portance. As long as the cleft between the races remains so broad,
as long as the memories of negro slavery remain so vivid, as long
as the negro race itself remains in a condition of such widespread
ignorance, courts will undoubtedly have to deal with efforts such
as are involved in this case to nullify in part the constitutional re-
quirements on this subject. It will be generally agreed that, aside
from the purely legal phase of the question, to permit such practices
-would have an unhealthy influence, and would tend to the postpone-
ment 9f the solution of one of our most vital as well as most difficult
-national problems.
ASSUMPTION OF RISK GROWING OUT OF THE NON-PERFORMANCE OF
A MASTER'S STATUTORY DUTY.
That the common law places upon the master certain duties for
the protection of his servant is fundamental; that these duties cannot
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be delegated so as to relieve the master from liability, although
deducible from, is equally elemental with the first proposition. One
of these coinmon law duties is the furnishing of reasonably safe
implements with which to work. The courts have, however, en-
grafted upon this principle a qualification, in that, although the
master has not performed his full duty, thereby creating an ad-
ditional risk which was both obvious and ordinary, yet the servant
by continuing his employment with knowledge of such delict, was
conclusively presumed to have accepted the increased hazard arising
therefrom. That is the doctrine of "assumption of risk." If an
injury accrued to him in such a contingency the servant was deemed
to have waived the master's non-performance of duty and no
recovery was possible.
Do the same rules of law apply if the master is under a statutory
duty to provide protection for his servant? The United States
Circuit Court of Appeals has come to the conclusion recently that
the doctrine of "assumption of risk" is equally applicable, whether
the duty be statutory or of the common law. A statute of Missouri
designed for the protection of employees provided that all exposed
gearings, etc., should be guarded. An employer complied with
the statute, but for a period of six weeks prior to an injury to one
of his employees he had allowed some of the guards to fall into
disuse so that a pair of rapidly revolving cogwheels were left.
exposed. A servant, a girl of 2o years of age, was required to work
at the machine containing these wheels, about ten or fifteen minutes
each day, and in consequence of their unguarded condition was
injured. The Circuit Court of Appeals holds that the servant is
entitled to no recovery, since by continuing in her employment she
had assumed the risk arising from the failure of the master to
comply with his statutory duty. In a strong dissenting opinion
Judge Thayer takes an opposite view. St. Louis Cordage Co.
v. Miller, 126 F. 495.
As to whether acquiescence by the servant under the above
conditions will be regarded in law as a waiver of compliance by the
master of a statutory duty, the courts differ. That there is no
waiver and that the servant is entitled to recovery for an injury
arising from the breach seems to be the rule in England, Illinois,
Indiana, Missouri, Wisconsin and Tennessee. Some of these courts.
even hold that the servant's contributory negligence will not affect
his recovery. On the other hand, the courts of Massachusetts,
New York, Michigan, Alabama and Colorado agree that the risk
arising from the breach of a statutory duty can be assumed as readily
as that resulting from a common law obligation.
The courts sustaining the doctrine of waivers rely in great part
on the maxim, "Volenti non fit injuria," and recurrence is made
for support to the case of Thomas v. Quartermaine, 18 Q. B. D.
685, in which it is said the maxim was first prominently applied
to an action for personal injuries. A later case, however, states,
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"in Thomas v. Quartermaine both the Lord Justices thought the
maxim would not apply at all where the injury arose by the direct
breach by the defendant of a statutory duty." Per Wills, I., in
Baddeley v. Granville, 19 Q. B. D. 423. In the latter case a man
was required by statute to be kept constantly at the entrance to
mines when the men were going up or down the shaft. Plaintiff
knew it to be the regular custom not to have a man in attend-
ance at night, and in consequence of such absence an injury re-
sulted. It was held the defense of volenti non fit injuria had no
application when an injury arose through the breach of a statutory
duty by the employer and recovery was allowed. Vide Smith v.
Baker, 1891 App. Cases 325; also Yarmouth v. France, i9 Q. B. D.
647, 653, 657.
So, in Cutlett v. Young, 143 Ill., 74, a statute provided that cages
used for conveying miners up and down a shaft should be covered.
Plaintiff continued working knowing of defendant's neglect to
cover the cages, and later was injured through the omision, but was
allowed to recover. The court said, "It was intended that in case
of injuries occasioned by any violation of the statute or by wilful
failure to comply with any of its provisions the right of recovery
should not depend upon the exercise of ordinary care in the per-
son injured or be precluded by contributory negligence." To same
effect, Bartlett v. Roach, 68 Ill., 174; Litchfield v. Taylor, 81 Ill.,
90.
In Boyd v. Brazil Coal Co., 25 Ind., App. 157, where a statute of
the same general import was in force, the decision reads, "A master
who, under the revised statutes relating to the safety of miners
owes his servant the duty of providing a safe place for him to work,
is not relieved from liability for his negligence by the neglect of the
servant or the servant's notice of danger or assumption of risk * * *
We believe, however, that the maxim volenti non fit injuria or doc-
trine of assumption of risk does not apply to a statutory duty im-
posed on the master, and the continuing of the servant in the em-
ploy of the master with knowledge of such breach of duty will
not prevent a recovery for an injury suffered by such breach." To
same effect, Hochstetter v. Coal Co., 8 Ind. App. 442.
In Wisconsin a statutory duty was imposed on railway com-
panies to fence their lands. A conductor remained in the employ
of the defendant knowing that this duty was not performed, but
the court held that this knowledge and acquiesence did not operate
as a waiver by him of his rights to recover for injuries sustained
through the want of a fence." "The deceased might well act," the
court says, "upon the presumption that the defendant would pro-
ceed to perform without unnecessary delay the duty which the
statute imposed upon it." Quackenbush v. Ry., 62 Wis. 411.
A statute in Tennessee provides that "Every railway company
shall keep the engineer or fireman or some other person always
upon the lookout ahead." The construction of this statute by the
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courts of that State is to the effect that where an accident occurs
by reason of the non-compliance on the part of the railway com-
pany with the statutory regulation, the right of action in favor of
the injured party is absolute, and that his contributory negligence
is no bar, though it must be considered in mitigation of damages.
Railroad v. Smith, 6 Heisk. 174; Same v. Walker, ii Heisk. 383;
Same v. Nowlin, i Lea 523.
The authority for the same rule in Missouri may be found in
Durant v. Lexington, 97 Mo., 62, where it was said, "Mere knowl-
edge by the plaintiff of the failure of the defendant to have the
protection required by law will not defeat an action for recovery
of damages accruing from a non-compliance."
On the other hand, the Factory Law of New York makes it
obligatory upon employes to guard exposed gearings, and a woman
twenty-one years of age was not allowed to recover for an injury
sustained in the operation of an ungeared machine. "We are of
the opinion," says the court, "that there is no reason, in principle
or authority, why an employee should not be allowed to assume the
obvious risks of the business as well under the Factory Act as other-
wise. There is no rule of public policy which prevents an employe
from deciding whether, in view of increased wages, the difficulty of
obtaining employment, or other sufficient reasons, it may not be
wise and prudent to accept employment subject to the rule of ob-
vious risks. The statute does not deprive them of their free agency
and right to manage their own affairs . Knisley v. Pratt, 148 N. Y.
372. Upon the same theory the court proceeds in O'Malley v. South
Boston Gas Co., 158 Mass. 135, when it says, "It would be an
unwarranted construction of the statute, which would tend to
defeat its object, to hold that laborers are no longer permitted to
contract to take the risk of working where there are peculiar dan-
gers from the arrangement of the place and from the kind and
quality of the machinery used." Vide Grand v. Railroad, 83 Mich.
564. An inspection of the case of Victor Coal Co. v. Muir, 20
Colo. 320, which is cited in support of the theory, shows that the
servant himself was a violator of the statute under which he sought
protection, so that the case affords a meagre basis for the proposi-
tion it is sought to sustain. Vide Birmingham v. Aller. 99 Ala. 359.
It is submitted, that when a statutory duty is imposed on an
employer for the protection of his servants, the better rule is that
the servant does not waive compliance by the master, and assume
the resulting risk by continuing in the master's service. The prop-
osition is submitted on the following grounds: First, that the
master is placed under a positive statutory duty which the servant
has a right to presume will be performed. Quackenbush v. Wiscon-
sin Ry. supra; Railway Co. v. Archibald, 17o U. S. 665. Any dis-
regard of this duty is not a mere omission, but a tort, as it is a
direct violation of a positive law. The master is, therefore, guilty
of a wrong before any injury accrues to his servant. It is contrary
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to principle to allow the master to take advantage of his own wrong
when the injury does acrue, because there may have been a tacit
acquiesence in the master's wrong on the part of the servant. The
master ought not to be allowed to rely upon his own neglect of
duty as a defense against injuries arising from such neglect, es-
pecially when the more manifest the neglect, the more certain the
defense. Second, any other construction would be against public
policy in that it would in effect nullify the statute. Durant v. Lex-
ington, supra. The primary object of the statute is to secure proper
protection to employes. If we adopt the doctrine of waiver, "the
statute would furnish the employe little protection. The mere re-
fusal of the owner to furnish the safeguards provided by the statute
would then be sufficient to exonerate him from liability if the em-
ploye continued in his employment and sustained injury." Hoch-
stetter v. Mosley, supra, As satisfactorily elucidating the theory that
the doctrine of assumption of risk, when applied to statutory duties,
is contrary to public policy, we can do no better than quote from
the opinion which first laid it down that the maxim volenti non fit
injuria has no application to such duties. "An obligation imposed
by statute," says Wills, J., "ought to be capable of enforcement with
respect to all future dealings between the parties affected by it
As the result of past breaches of the obligation people may come to
any agreement they like; but as to future breaches of it there ought
to be no encouragement given to the making of an agreement be-
tween A and B that B shall be at liberty to break the law which
has been passed for the protection of A. Such an agreement might
be illegal, although I do not hold this to be so. But it seems to
me that if the supposed agreement between the deceased and the
defendant, in consequence of which the principle of volenti non fit
injuria is sought to be applied, comes to this, that the master em-
ploys the servant on the terms that the latter shall waive the
breach by the master of an obligation imposed on him by statute
and shall connive at his disregard of the statutory obligation im-
posed on him for the benefit of others as well as himself, such an
agreement would be in violation of public policy and ought not to
be listened to." Baddeley v. Granville, f9 Q. B. D. 423; see also
Blamires v. Lancashire Ry., L. R. 8 Ex. 283; also Reno-Employers'
Liability Acts, sec. 74, 178.
